4 Alberto R. Coil diminishing its credibility and undermining thelong-term viability of the very values it seeks to spread.
Tony Smith makes a compelling case for seizing the moment in Wilson's name. As he sees it, the United States and its allies are strong, the enemies of liberalism are on the defensive, and there are plenty of opportunities for a limited investment of American resources to make a substantial difference. The world may never again be so pliable, and action now may help to move at least some regions of the world in directions congruent with long-term American interests and values. The burden of proof, as Smith sees it, is on those opposed to active
Wilsonian engagement to show that it would be harmful.
As sympathetic as one may be to the moral arguments for a muscular Wilsonianism, several qualifications are in order. First, a proper sense of modesty in the projection of America's rhetoric is necessary. There is no escaping that the United States, exceptional as it is in some ways, is still a fallen, sinful society, to use the language of classical Christian realism with which readers of Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Butterfield are familiar. We are as eager to put our interests at the center of our international agenda as any other state, and as easily able as anyone else to deceive ourselves about the extent to which our interests correspond with those of the rest of the world. One problem with Wilsonianism is that its proponents tend to forget this and take their rhetoric far more seriously than is fitting. Our allies and friends are prepared to respect us when we make a case for policies that benefit us as well as them, but our sanctimoniousness erodes our credibility and elicits their resentment when we speak as if our actions are guided by disinterestedness. A great power's rhetoric, as Theodore Roosevelt well understood, is central to its leadership. More often than not, Wilsonian rhetoric weakens rather than enhances our leadership through its hubris and self-righteousness, though this is far more obvious to the rest of the world than it is to us. A sense of modesty would help to counteract this weakness.
Second, a sense of measure would also be healthy with regard to our strategic aims. Smith hints at this when he acknowledges that a humanitarian intervention on behalf of Tibet would make no sense given the risks of war with China. Similar prudential restraints would rule out an American rescue effort on behalf of the beleaguered Chechens, or a "prodemocracy campaign" in Saudi Arabia, which would destabilize a key ally. Selectivity is essential, once again calling for a greater sense of modesty and a willingness to lower the decibels of the rhetoric. As Caplan points out, there is no clear consensus on this question. The older, almost absolute ban on humanitarian intervention that dominated international law throughout the twentieth century crumbled over the last decade.
There were two main reasons for this. First, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an international system in which the United States and its allies hold a preeminent position, together with great freedom of action to carry out such interventions whenever their interests dictate it or their publics demand it. Second, the conceptions of state sovereignty on which the older absolutist position was based are no longer credible. In our crowded, highly interdependent planet, certain human rights outrages that decades ago could be coldly disposed of as a state's domestic concern no longer are truly domestic because they affect the stability and welfare of neighboring countries, Second, the alluring prospect of fighting without casualties meant that NATO was willing to take its time, thereby encouraging the Serbs to speed up their timetable for ethnic cleansing. The record shows that during the weeks of the air campaign, the Serbs moved ruthlessly to uproot as many Albanian Kosovars as possible. Along with the ethnic cleansing went an unprecedented degree of rape, looting, and murder. In initiating force against Serbia, NATO had to contemplate the possibility that, with their backs against the wall and little to lose, the Serbs would be tempted to destroy the Albanian presence in Kosovo once and for all so as to make an Albanian-free Kosovo an irreversible fait accompli. NATO's failure to anticipate this development, and even worse, its failure to act once it became apparent that it was happening, was morally irresponsible. Clausewitz who, almost two centuries ago, recognized that even limited wars, those conflicts in which "the statesman seeks to turn the terrible two-handed sword that is war into the lightest rapier, fit only for thrusts and parries, " can degenerate into bitter, all-out general war as the passions of the people are aroused and outside parties intervene. While the risk of such escalation may have been low in Kosovo, and will likely remain low in Chechnya, it will not always be so. Inevitably, as the use of "casual war" spreads, some statesman somewhere is bound to miscalculate its consequences, and what was conceived initially as a self-contained conflict could escalate and draw in great-power antagonists. The
Viennese statesmen who contemplated a limited punitive strike against Serbia in 1914 had no idea of the global conflagration they were about to kindle.
In his essay on ethical dilemmas in U.S. peacekeeping and peacemaking, Second, the United States needs to own up to its responsibilities for the broader international legal regime within which it operates and from which it derives enormous benefits as the mightiest status quo power in the world.
American leaders and politicians must desist from the present schizophrenic behavior in which they routinely call for greater UN action to deal with complex humanitarian emergencies, while belittling the organization's importance and prestige and making an unseemly spectacle every time the United States pays its dues. If we are going to push for more elastic criteria for humanitarian intervention, and at the same time elicit UN support for such interventions in Bosnia and elsewhere, we must treat the United Nations not uncritically but certainly with less contempt than we seem to do now. This, too, is implicit in the notion of the United States' acting and speaking responsibly.
Finally, as the coalition leader and chief force provider for such interventions, the United States needs to wrestle with its responsibilities in conducting the military operations at the heart of humanitarian interventions. Do we make the avoidance of casualties such a high priority that we refuse to use ground troops and resort to air strategies in ways that increase civilian suffering? Is it 
